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The emergence of China as one of the largest trading nation provides challenges and 
opportunities to its neighboring ASEAN countries. In the face of the rise of China, there were 
concerns that ASEAN economies may be adversely affected. One of the concerns is that the 
world export markets of labor intensive goods will be threatened if China turns into the world 
low cost manufacturing workshop. Meanwhile, trade between China and ASEAN countries 
increased dramatically during the past decade. Not surprisingly, China’s accession to WTO and 
the future establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between ASEAN and China will further 
change the trade relations between the two areas. The paper analyses the past trade patterns 
between China and ASEAN countries and find out the impact of the FTA on ASEAN countries, 
in particular, the impacts to specific industries in each individual country. Secondly, the paper 
also examines the ever increasing role of foreign direct investment between the two regions and 
finally, it analyzes the possible policy responses of the ASEAN countries and consequences of 
these policies.   
 
JEL classification: F13 
Keywords: ASEAN trade policy, rising Chinese economy   1




The emergence of China as a large trading nation in recent years creates both challenges and 
opportunities to its neighbor competitors. Facing the fast increasing economic power of China, 
ASEAN economies (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) are somewhat affected in various 
respects and they have invariably adopt different strategies. One of the concerns is that the world 
export markets of labor intensive goods will be threatened by China as it is the world low cost 
manufacturing workshop. Meanwhile, trade between China and ASEAN increased dramatically 
during the past decade, grew at an annual average of 19 percent (Table 8). China’s exports to 
ASEAN-5 grew from US$10 billion in 1995 to US$44 billion in 2004 while its imports from 
ASEAN grew from US$8.2 billion in 1995 to US$42.2 billion in 2004. Not surprisingly, China’s 
accession to WTO and the future establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between ASEAN 
and China will further change the trade relations between the two areas.   
 
  What are the opportunities and challenges to ASEAN once the FTA between the two is 
established? And how will the ASEAN economies be affected and how will they respond to the 
changes? It is of great importance to have a thorough investigation of the issue. The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the above issues from three aspects: (1) look at past trade pattern 
between China and ASEAN and find out the impact of the FTA on ASEAN members, in 
particular, the impacts to specific industries in each individual country; (2) examine the ever 
increasing role of foreign direct investment between the two regions and (3) analyze the possible 
policy options and consequences of the policies by ASEAN members.   
 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief review of the recent 
development in ASEAN economies and the trend of the economic relationship between ASEAN 
and Chinese economies. Section three analyzes in detail of the evidences of the possible 
challenges and opportunities of the rising Chinese economy to ASEAN members. Section four 
discusses the policy responses of ASEAN members to the rising Chinese economy and the 
possible consequences. Section five provides brief concluding remarks.    
                                                 
1 The paper was presented at the international conference: “WTO, China and the Asian Economies, IV” Beijing, 
China, June 24-25, 2006. We thank the comments of the participants.   2
2. ASEAN Economies and Recently Appeared Problems 
The ASEAN Economies. The outbreak of Asian financial crisis in 1997 was critical for ASEAN 
economies. Since then the development road became stumble and the future was getting unclear 
(See Table 1). Before the crisis, however, the ASEAN economies documented a long term high 
growth rate during the period of 1980s and early 1990s. Started from a very primary level of 
technology and with limited market size and resources, outward looking policies in trade and 
investment were the most feasible choices for ASEAN. Exports of labor intensive products and 
inflow of foreign direct investment eventually transformed ASEAN into the fast growing 
economy in the last two decades of the previous century.    
 
  The performances of the ASEAN economies are, however, diversified. Among them, 
Singapore singled out close to developed economy, Malaysia and Thailand are at a relatively 
high industrialization level, and Philippines and Indonesia are at the less developed level. Major 
economic indicators of the ASEAN-5 in the last decade are listed in Table 2.  
Table 1 Real GDP Growth Rate of ASEAN-5 and China (%) 
 Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  China 
1987 4.9  5.4  4.8  9.4  9.5  11.1 
1988 5.8  8.9  6.3  11.1  13.3 11.3 
1989 7.5  9.2  6.1  9.2  12.3  4.3 
1990 7.1  9.7  2.7  8.3  11.6  3.9 
1991 6.6  8.7  -0.7  6.7  7.9  8.0 
1992 5.8  8.5  0.0  5.8  7.5  13.2 
1993 5.9  8.4  1.0  9.9  7.7  13.5 
1994 7.5  9.2  4.4  11.4  9.0  12.7 
1995 8.2  9.8  4.7  8.0  9.3  10.5 
1996 7.8  10.0  5.8  7.6  5.9  9.6 
1997 4.7  7.3  5.2  8.5  -1.4  8.8 
1998 -13.1  -7.4  -0.6  0.1  -10.8  7.8 
1999 0.8  6.1  3.4  5.9  4.4  7.1 
2000 4.8  8.9  4.4  9.6  4.8  8.0 
2001 3.8  0.3  1.8  -2.0  2.2  7.5 
2002 4.4  4.1  4.3  3.2  5.3  8.3 
2003 4.9  5.3  4.7  1.4  6.9  9.5 
2004 5.1  7.1  6.1  8.4  6.1  9.5 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, 
2005. 
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Table 2  Key Economic Indicators of ASEAN-5 and China 1995 – 2004  
Country / Item  1995  1996  1997  1998 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Indonesia              
   Per Capita GDP, US$   1038  1154  1083  467 675  802  788  948  1116  1191 
   Unemployment rate, %     7.2 4.9 4.7  5.5 6.4 6.1  8.1 9.1 9.9  ... 
   Exports, US$ Billion     45.4  49.8 53.4  48.8 48.6 62.1  56.3 57.1 60.9 77.8 
   Imports, US$ Billion     40.6  42.9 41.6  27.3 24.0 33.5  30.9 31.2 32.5 51.7 
   Exchange rate, Rupiah/US$   2249  2342  2909  10014 7855  8422  10261  9311  8577  8939 
Malaysia              
   Per Capita GDP, US$  4294  4764  4623  3254 3485  3844  3665  3880  4142  4604 
   Unemployment rate, %     3.1 2.5 2.4  3.2 3.4 3.0  3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 
   Exports, US$ Billion     73.7  78.2 78.9  73.4 84.5 98.1  88.1  93.3 104.9 126.5 
   Imports, US$ Billion     77.6  78.4 79.0  58.3 65.4 82.1  73.3 79.5 82.7  104.2 
   Exchange Rate, Ringgit/US$    2.50 2.52 2.81  3.92 3.80 3.80  3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 
Philippines              
   Per Capita GDP, US$  1083  1183  1149  889 1015  987  907  957  970  1035 
   Unemployment rate, %     8.4 7.4 7.9  9.6 9.6  10.1  9.8 10.2 10.1 10.9 
   Exports, US$ Billion     17.3  20.5 25.2  29.4 35.4 38.2  32.1 35.1 36.2 46.7 
   Imports, US$ Billion     28.2  31.7 39.1  29.5 30.7 34.4  33.0 35.4 37.5 47.8 
   Exchange Rate, Pesos/US$  25.7  26.2 29.4  40.8 39.0 44.1  50.9 51.6 54.2 56.0 
Singapore              
   Per Capita GDP, US$  23807 25106 25143  20922 20891 23042  20774 21206 22071 25192 
   Unemployment rate, %     2.0 2.0 1.8  3.2 3.5 3.1  3.3 4.4 4.7 4.0 
   Exports, US$ Billion     118  125  125  109 114  137  121  125  144  179 
   Imports, US$ Billion     124  131  132  101 111  134  116  116  127  162 
   Exchange Rate S$/US$    1.41  1.41 1.48  1.67 1.69 1.72  1.79 1.79 1.74 1.69 
Thailand              
   Per Capita GDP, US$  2829  3032  2490  1828 1984  1972  1844  2008  2246  2547 
   Unemployment rate, %     1.1 1.1 0.9  3.4 3.0 2.4  2.6 1.8 1.5 1.5 
   Exports, US$ Billion     57.2  55.7 57.5  54.4 58.4 68.9  65.1 68.8 80.3 97.4 
   Imports, US$ Billion     73.6  73.3 62.8  43.1 50.3 61.9  62.0 64.7 75.8 95.3 
   Exchange Rate, Baht/US$    24.9  25.3 31.3  41.3 37.8 40.1  44.4 42.9 41.4 40.2 
China              
   Per Capita GDP, US$  581  671  730  762 791  856  924  992  1100  1273 
   Unemployment rate, %     2.9  3.0 3.1  3.1 3.1 3.1  3.6 4.0 4.3 4.2 
   Exports, US$ Billion     148  151  182  183 194  249  266  325  438  614 
   Imports, US$ Billion     132  138  142  140 165  224  243  295  412  569 
   Exchange Rate, Yuan/US$    8.35  8.31 8.28  8.27 8.27 8.27  8.27 8.27 8.27 8.27 
Data source: Asian Development Bank, 2005.  
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 One thing in common of all the ASEAN-5 is that the per capita GDP did not change very 
much during the past decade, only Singapore and Malaysia received a small increase. Their trade 
volume however all increased moderately. The reason for this phenomenon is due to the 
depreciation in currency value, which could be a result of overall decreasing competitiveness of 
their economy.    
   
Recently Appeared Problems. The occurrence of 1997’s Asian financial crisis seriously hit the 
region, caused unstable currencies and significant withdrawal of FDI. The world economic 
recession in 2000 further put the future of these countries into uncertainty. Among the ASEAN-5, 
Indonesia and Philippines suffered serious from the high unemployment and unstable currency 
value, while Malaysia and Singapore suffered more from the unstable economic growth and 
unemployment.  The economy of Thailand, however, moved in a relatively smooth mode. In 
addition to their domestic problems, high oil price, fast movement of globalization and 
increasing competition from newly rising power of China are definitely three important 
international factors to ASEAN economies in the recent time.  
 
3. Challenges and Opportunities to ASEAN Facing Rising China 
Accompanying the stumble road for ASEAN economies since late 1990s is the emerging 
Chinese economy. Though China’s non-depreciation policy during the crisis helped the region 
out of the downturn trend eventually, but the devaluation of Chinese Yuan in 1994 and then fast 
expanded China’s exports in labor intensive products were one of the important factors to the 
crisis occurrence. And the consequently well developed Chinese economy brought an 
unpresedented shock not only to the region of Southeast Asia and but also to the rest of the world.  
 
3.1  Competition in World Export Market 
The success of China’s economic reform generated tremendous economic power as a huge trade 
nation and magnetic field for international investment capital. The abundant labor and land have 
turned China into a world production factory for labor intensive products. China’s WTO entry in 
2001 further ensured the world market access for its exports in the coming time. Within just ten 
years, China’s exports increased from US$120 billion in 1994 to US$762 billion in 2005, ranked 
world second largest exporting country after Germany.    5
Given the steady slow growth of world market demand for labor intensive goods in the 
past ten years, fast expansion of China’s exports will inevitably take certain market shares away 
from traditional labor intensive products exporting countries. The ASEAN economies are the 
immediate affected ones, among them, Singapore is the most likely affected because a large 
proportion of China’s exports production is relocated from Taiwan and Hong Kong, which 
produce the similar goods as Singapore does. Table 2 shows that since 1997 financial crisis, 
ASEAN’s exports experienced a wide fluctuation while China’s exports grew often at a high rate 
of more than 20 per cent. As for competition in the third market, Table 3 provides the amounts of 
exports of ASEAN and China to US market. Table 4 indicates that the changes of ASEAN’s 
exports to US market do not have the often high growth rates as in early 1990s, while China’s 
exports to US increased mostly with a double digits growth rate. Although there could be many 
reasons for the fluctuations of ASEAN’s exports to US market, by just looking at the data, we 
can prove that the competition from China is the most important factor. 
 
Table 3  US Imports from ASEAN-5 and China in Billions of US dollars 
  World 
Total of US 
Indonesia Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore Thailand  ASEAN-5  China 
1987 424.4  4.0  3.1 2.5 7.3 2.3 19.2  3.1
1988 459.5  3.6  3.7 2.6 9.5 3.3 22.7  3.5
1989 492.9  4.3  4.9 3.3 10.7 4.5 27.7  4.7
1990 517.0  4.2  5.2 3.3 11.7 5.5 29.7  5.8
1991 508.4  4.2  6.0 3.3 11.9 6.3 31.7  6.8
1992 553.9  5.3  7.9 4.0 13.6 7.6 38.5  9.6
1993 603.4  6.1 10.2 4.6 15.1 8.3 44.3  18.4
1994 689.2  6.7 12.7 5.3 17.6 9.6 51.8  22.5
1995 770.9  7.5 15.7 6.4 21.2 10.3 61.0  26.0
1996 822.0  8.1 14.9 7.4 23.2 10.4 63.9  28.9
1997 899.0  8.5 15.2 9.2 23.1 11.8 67.8  35.4
1998 944.4  8.5 16.4 10.3 22.0 14.0 71.2  41.2
1999  1059.4  8.6 19.2 11.1 22.6 13.5 75.0  47.4
2000  1259.3  9.4 22.8 12.5 23.6 15.5 83.8  62.3
2001  1180.1  7.7 17.8 8.9 18.7 13.2 47.8  54.3
2002  1202.3  7.5 18.8 8.6 19.1 13.5 48.6  70.0
2003  1305.1  7.3 20.5 7.2 20.5 13.6 48.8  92.6
2004  1525.3 10.5 23.7 8.1 23.5 15.5 57.9  139.7
Source: 1. Asian Development Bank, 2005 for ASEAN and China.  
   2.  http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ for United States imports total.  
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Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ASEAN-
5 
China 
1988 8.3  -9.8 17.6 5.7 29.9 42.5 18.0  12.5
1989 7.3  18.3 32.4 26.3 12.8 39.7 22.3  33.8
1990 4.9  -2.6  6.2 -1.5 8.8 20.0 7.2  22.5
1991 -1.7  1.0  16.5 0.6 2.1 15.2 6.7  17.5
1992 9.0  27.0 32.1 22.9 13.8 21.5 21.5  41.5
1993 8.9  15.4 28.2 13.7 11.2 8.4 15.0  91.7
1994 14.2  8.5  24.7 14.6 16.8 15.8 17.1  22.1
1995 11.8  12.2  23.4 21.1 20.0 7.5 17.6  16.0
1996 6.6  8.2  -4.8 15.7 9.6 0.9 4.9  10.9
1997 9.4  5.3  2.0 24.5 -0.4 13.3 6.0  22.4
1998 5.0  -0.4  7.7 12.3 -4.6 18.7 5.0  16.6
1999 12.2  1.4  17.0 8.3 2.4 -3.4 5.3  14.9
2000 18.9  9.3  18.8 12.6 4.4 14.8 11.7  31.4
2001 -5.6  -18 -21.9 -28.8 -20.8 -14.8 -43  -12.8
2002 1.9  -2.6  5.6 -3.4 2.1 1.5 1.7  28.9
2003 8.9  -2.7  9.0 -7.0 7.3 0.7 0  32.2
2004 16.9  43.8  15.6 12.5 14.6 14.0 18.6  50.9
Source: 1. Asian Development Bank, 2005 for ASEAN and China.  
   2.  http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/ for United States imports total.  
 
To further assess the extent of impact and time period of China’s competition in specific 
type of industry, a simple market share regression model is used as follows,  
 
u bMS a MS c i + + =              (1) 
Where  i MS  is individual ASEAN member’s total market shares in the US for a particular 
type of products,  c MS  is the China’s market share in the US for the same type of products. The 
assumption is that the sign of parameter b should be negative if competition happened between 
ASEAN members and China for that particular type of products. If a positive sign appears for 
parameter b, the assumption of competition of China and ASEAN members should not hold in 
that product. Statistically, the method should also overcome the possible problems of 
heteroscedasticity when different products are pooled into one group. Another assumption is that 
the sum of the market shares of the two regions maintains a stable trend. The data covers 1-digit 
and 2-digit SITC goods and the time periods are 1987-1992 (Chew and Liu 1998) and 1987-2000 
(Liu and Luo 2004). The results are presented in Table 5.    7
In general, competition was most severe in primary good sector between ASEAN 
countries and China, while the competition between Singapore and China is mostly in 
manufacturing sectors. In the period 1987-1992 (Chew and Liu 1998), no competition was 
observed except in the group of manufactured good of SITC 81-89. However, if the date extends 
to the period 1987-2000, the category of basic manufactures (SITC 61-60) turned to be 
significantly negative and the bigger group of one digit regression (SITC 5-9) also turned to be 
significantly negative. Overall, we can conclude that the export competition in US market 
between Singapore and China was getting severe starting from the early mid 1990s. The result is 
not surprising and is consistent with the view that Singapore has a relatively advanced 
production technology among the four NIEs. With time passes, China may catch up very quickly 
in the basic and mid range of industrial products. In the coming years, Singapore is therefore 
expected to face further pressure from China. The above estimation however covers only the data 
up to year 2000. After year 2000, the competition is getting more severe to all of the ASEAN-5 
members.  
 
Table 5 Competition matrix for ASEAN-5 and China for different types of products in US 
market (1987-2000) 
 





























































































































Note: N is the number of observations; numbers in the parentheses below the estimators are t-
values. 
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3.2  Competition in Attracting FDI  
No doubt, the diversion of FDI from Southeast Asia to China is an obvious fact. The main flow 
of FDI to Asia has changed the direction in recent years that more than 70 per cent of the FDI is 
now flowing into China instead to Southeast Asia as before. Table 6 shows the FDI diversion 
pattern for Singapore and China over the past two decades. Historically, Singapore relies on FDI 
heavily for its economic expansion and for its industry level upgrading. Even the economy size is 
small, the FDI inflow to Singapore only fell behind China significantly after 1991. Less capital 
inflow and own capital outflow could mean less economic growth and less jobs, but some argued 
that the competition could appear any time and the jobs might not be kept if one country’s 
economic environment is not competitive enough. FDI diversions need to be viewed in different 
perspectives (Tain and Ku 2003).  
 
Table 6   FDI inflows of China and Singapore, US$ million  
Year China  Singapore Year China Singapore
1980 57  1,236 1992 11,156 2,204
1981 265  1,660 1993 27,515 4,686
1982 430  1,602 1994 33,787 8,550
1983 636  1,134 1995 35,849 11,503
1984 1,258 1,302 1996 40,180 9,303
1985 1,659 1,047 1997 44,237 13,533
1986 1,875 1,710 1998 43,751 7,594
1987 2,314 2,836 1999 40,319 13,245
1988 3,194 3,655 2000 40,772 12,464
1989 3,393 2,887 2001 46,846 10,949
1990 3,487 5,575 2002 52,700 7,655
1991 4,366 4,887 2003 53,500 5,528
 
Source:  
1. World Trade Analyzer (WTA) CDROM, 2001 and International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, 2001.  
2. Data after 2000 are from http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/economy.html, and 
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi_cumulative.html.  
 
  Table 7 shows further that during the past decade, the competition in attraction of FDI 
between China and ASEAN is getting severe. The relative share of ASEAN comparing to that of 
China shrunk further to 15 percent.  
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Table 7 FDI inflow of China and ASEAN-5 in past 11 years, US$ billion 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
China  27.5 33.7 35.8 40.1 44.2 43.7 38.7 38.3 44.2 49.3 53.5 
Indonesia  2.0 2.1 4.3 6.1  4.6 -0.3 -2.7 -4.5 -3.2 -1.5 -0.5 
Malaysia  5.0 4.3 4.1 5.0 5.1 2.1 3.8 3.7 0.5 3.2 2.4 
Philippines  1.2 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.2 2.2 1.7 1.3 0.9 1.7 0.3 
Singapore  4.6  8.5 11.5  9.3 13.5  7.5 13.2 12.4 10.9 7.6 5.5 
Thailand  1.8 1.3 2.0 2.3 3.8 7.3 6.1 3.3 3.8 0.9 1.9 
             
ASEAN-5  14.7 17.9 23.5 24.4 28.4 19.0 22.2 16.4 13.1 12.0 96.7 
China and ASEAN-5 
Total  42.2 51.7 59.4 64.6 72.7 62.7 60.9 54.8 57.3 61.3 63.1 
ASEAN-5/Total  35 35 40 38 39 30 36 30 23 20 15 
China/  Total  65 65 60 62 61 70 64 70 77 80 85 
Data source: Asian Development Bank, 2005.  
 
3.3 Increasing Importance of China’s Market to ASEAN 
In the meantime, China with large domestic market provides ASEAN with opportunities for their 
imports. For the past decade, all of the ASEAN-5 experienced fast increase in trade with China. 
The annual average increasing rate is all more than 14 percent. (See Table 8).  
Table 8  ASEAN’s Trade with China, 1995-2004, US$, million 
 
Country  /  Item  1995 1996 1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003  2004 
1995-2004, 
average % 
Indonesia                 
   Exports  1741  2057  2229  1832  2008  2767  2200  2903  3802  5870  14.5 
   Imports  1495  1597  1518  906  1242  2022  1842  2427  2957  5693  16.0 
Malaysia                 
   Exports  1889  1882  1852  1994  2318  3028  3821  5253  6810  8460  18.1 
   Imports  1709  1876  2232  1849  2139  3237  3804  6157  7300  10339  22.1 
Philippines                 
      Exports  209 328 244  344 575 663 793  1356 2145 5342  43.3 
      Imports  660 653 972 1199  1040 786 975  1252 1798 3539  20.5 
Singapore                 
   Exports  2759  3395  4053  4065  3920  5377  5329  6863  10134  15392  21.0 
   Imports  4042  4439  5668  4851  5697  7116  7195  8869  11073  16211  16.7 
Thailand                 
   Exports  1642  1868  1744  1769  1861  2806  2863  3553  5707  7103  17.6 
   Imports  2096  1953  2260  1822  2495  3377  3711  4928  6067  8185  16.3 
Data source: Asian Development Bank, 2005.   10
  It is interesting to see that in 2003 and 2004 Singapore’s exports rebounded with a sharp 
increase of 15 and 28 per cent respectively comparing to the 3 per cent increase in 2002 (Table 
2). The destination change of Singapore’s exports for the past 10 years is shown in Table 9, from 
which we can observe clearly that the quickest expanded market for Singapore is China. In 2004, 
Singapore’s exports to China increased by 51.5 per cent. In 2004, the trade volume between the 
two countries reached US$31.5 billion, increased by 48.6 per cent, accounted 9.2 per cent of 
Singapore’s total trade, while in 1995, it was only 2.8 per cent. In 2004, China replaced Hong 
Kong became Singapore’s fourth largest trading partner after Malaysia, US, EU and Japan.  The 
year of 2004 also marked that the sum of trade volume of Singapore with China and Hong Kong 
over passed Malaysia becoming Singapore’s first largest market and this change only happened 
within less than ten years.  
 
Imports of Singapore from China show another facet of its trade relationship with China, 
the increasing complementarity. More often than not, Singapore recorded a trade deficit with 
China in the past ten years. China’s diversified resources, products and technology become 
Singapore’s important supplier in consumption goods and in production parts (Chew and Liu 
1998). 
 
The potentials of China’s WTO entry and future FTA to exports of ASEAN. Facing the 
emerging Chinese economy, one major concern of the Asian countries was that the rising China 
could become a threat to other countries politically and economically. Recent development in the 
relationship between China and Asian countries, however, shows a very different trend. The 
strong demand for investment and consumption in the fast growing Chinese economy is 
appearing as a leading force to turn the economies of neighboring countries from stagnation or 
downturn to a rising trend. The fast increase of exports of Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore to 
China in recent years all shows the signal. The “world largest market” is functioning.   
  
With China’s WTO entry and the on going progress of FTA between China and ASEAN 
countries, the impact of China’s tariff reduction and trade restriction removal on trade and 
investment could be substantial to the related countries. To examine the effect of the policy and 
institutional change of China on specific industries in Singapore economy, a model of   11
Singapore’s exports related to exchange rate, China’s tariff reduction and time trend is estimated 
using the SITC data for the period of 1987 to 2000.   
 
Table 9   Direction of Singapore’s Exports and Imports, billion US dollars   
Country  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Exports, total    118.2  125.1  125.3 109.8  114.7 137.9 121.7 125.0 144.1  179.4 
1.  Malaysia  22.7  22.5  21.8  16.7  18.9 25.0 21.1 21.8 22.7  27.2 
2.    US  21.6 23.1 23.1 21.8  22.0 23.8 18.7 19.1 20.5  23.2 
3.  Hong Kong   10.1  10.2  12.0  9.2  8.8 10.8 10.8 11.4  14..4  17.6 
4.  Japan  9.2  10.2  8.8  7.2  8.5 10.4  9.3  8.9 9.6  11.5 
5.  China, P.  R.   2.8  3.3  4.0 4.0  3.9 5.3 5.3 6.8  10.1  15.3 
6.    Thailand  6.8 7.0 5.7 4.2  5.0 5.8 5.3 5.7 6.1  7.7 
7.  Korea   3.2  4.7  3.6  2.5  3.5 4.9 4.6 5.2 6.0  7.3 
8.    Germany  4.0 3.8 3.6 3.3  3.2 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.4  6.2 
9.  Netherlands  3.1  2.8  3.0  3.7  3.8 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.6  5.4 
10.  Australia  2.6  2.8  2.9  3.1  3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 4.6  6.6 
                
Imports, total    124.4  131.3  132.5  101.6  111.0 134.6 116.0 116.4 127.9  162.9 
1.  Malaysia  19.3  19.7  19.9  15.6  17.2 22.8 20.0 21.2 21.5  24.9 
2.    US  18.7 21.5 22.3 18.7  19.0 20.2 19.1 16.6 18.0  20.7 
3.    Japan  26.3 23.8 23.2 17.0  18.5 23.1 16.0 14.5 15.3  19.0 
4.  China, P. R.   4.0  4.4  5.6 4.8  5.6 7.1 7.1 8.8  11.0  16.2 
5.    Thailand  6.4 7.1 6.8 4.8  5.2 5.8 5.1 5.4 5.5  6.7 
6.    Korea  5.4 4.8 4.1 3.0  4.1 4.8 3.8 4.3 4.9  6.9 
7.  Germany  4.3  4.7  45  3.4  3.6 4.2 3.8 3.9 4.8  5.6 
8.  Saudi Arabia  3.8  4.9  5.3 3.2  3.2 4.3 4.2 3.8 3.9  5.0 
9.  Hong Kong  4.1  4.2  3.9  2.8  3.1 3.5 2.7 2.8 3.0  3.6 
10.  Philippines  1.1 1.3 1.9 2.3  2.9 3.3 2.5 2.5 2.8  4.2 
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2005   (www.adb.org/statistics) 
May 2006. 
 
u YEAR a TR a ER a a EX + + + + = 3 2 1 0        (2) 
 
where  EX = ASEAN’s exports to China (US$000), 
  ER= exchange rate between Chinese Yuan and individual ASEAN member country 
current, Chinese Yuan/ASEAN member country currency, 
  TR= China's import tariff rate, average tariff rate in a specific industry (%). 
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Tariff and exchange rate are two main factors that influence trade. This model allows us to 
analyze the effect of changes in the two variables on trade. According to economic theory, both 
tariff and exchange rate share an inverse relationship with trade value. Therefore the sign of 
parameter of both tariff and exchange rate should be negative. Another variable added to our 
model is the year variable. This variable helps to account for changes in trade value that is 
attributed to economic factors other than tariff and exchange rate.  
 
Within the primary sector, there are 5 individual industries. Hence 4 dummy variables are 
introduced into the model. Dummy variables help to capture effects that are due to changes in 
any industries within the primary sector. Three dummy variables are also introduced to the 
manufacturing sector model for the same reason. The results are presented in Table 10.  
 
Table 10 Tariff-export matrix for different types of products in China market from ASEAN-5  
(1987-2000) 
 











































































































Note: N is the number of observations; due to the conversion from Harmonized System to SITC 
code and the difference in general tariff rates, the number of observation is not following 
the pattern that within each year there are 5 observations (for sitc 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). Estimators 
are tariff’s coefficients; numbers in the parentheses below the estimators are t-values. 
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The results show that Singapore and Malaysia are benefiting more from China’s tariff cut 
in manufacturing goods, while Indonesia is benefiting more in primary goods. Singapore is 
benefiting substantially in all manufactures with a rate from US$153,080 to US$636,270 for 
each sitc two-digit item for one per cent tariff reduction in China, and the current average tariff 
of China is 11.3 per cent. By the end of 5
th year of China’s WTO entry, the average tariff rate of 
China should fall to 9 per cent, while once the China-ASEAN FTA established in 2010, the tariff 
will be removed completely. The biggest effect is for the large item of crude materials, which is 
Singapore’s refined oil exports. If the tariff eventually removed completely, the total stimulation 
to Singapore’s exports will certainly a big impact.  
 
4. Policy Responses and Adjustment of ASEAN Countries 
Despite the severe challenges posed by the emergence of China as an economic powerhouse, the 
ASEAN region as a whole takes a positive approach towards a new scenario. Instead of a direct 
confrontation either in the form of direct competition in international market or through trade 
protectionism as practiced by the United States and European Union, the ASEAN countries 
collaborate and in fact, in no small measure integrate with the Chinese economy. First, in a self-
help manner, they adopts regional co-operation in forming the ASEAN free trade zone, and 
secondly, expand the free trade zone to include China (ASEAN plus one). At the national level, 
each of the countries separately signed free trade agreements with third parties, to secure its 
market access. More importantly, the ASEAN countries accept China now as another engine of 
economic growth by integrating their economies with the Chinese economy. To avert direct 
competition with China, they make extraneous effort by moving up the technological ladder so 
that they are always ahead of China. In no small effort, they also develop their niche areas to 
avoid head-on collusion with China. For those relatively large economies such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam, they take a two-track approach. On the one hand, they continue 
with the export-oriented approach, albeit with some differences in view of the emergence of 
China. On the other hand, they look inward to their domestic market as a new source of 
economic stimulus for sustaining their economic growth. Such an approach is now called 
Thaksinomics.   14
 
4.1 Regional Approach towards the Rise of China 
As far back as in 1993, ASEAN countries took the initiative to set up the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA). The purpose was not so much a direct response to the rise of China but rather for 
the humble aim to integrate a market economy comprising of 500 million people in Southeast 
Asia. On this free trade platform, intra-ASEAN industrial linkages can be forged with the 
ultimate aim of developing the ASEAN region as a viable international production centre. Such a 
move is economically beneficial to all the countries. Firstly, industries in the region can enjoy 
massive economies of scale. Secondly, comparative advantage of each country can be exploited 
and intra-trade can be expanded. Finally, through industrial linkages, an integrated production 
and trade system will be developed such that the regional as a whole can withstand the onslaught 
of severe competition in the international market.  
 
  Apart from the AFTA, ASEAN countries extend their regional co-operation into 
investment areas. These include the formation of the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), the 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) scheme, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, 
e-ASEAN, and the ASEAN Integration of Preferences. These regional co-operation efforts were 
initiated, like the AFTA, not so much to avert the so-called threats from the rise of China (Zainal 
Aznam, 2003), but rather the rise of China makes the need for these agreements more pressing as 
a self-help approach to sustain regional economic growth. 
 
  ASEAN as a whole is China’s fifth largest trading partner and, at the same time China is 
ASEAN’s fourth largest trading partner. In addition, ASEAN also invest significantly in China. 
The close relationship between the two parties calls for further co-operation in trade and 
investment. In 2001, both parties agreed to sign the ASEAN-China FTA which covers 
commodity and service trade, as well as investment. Under the agreement, the free trade zone 
will be established among the developed ASEAN countries and China by year 2010, and extend 
to less developed ASEAN nations by year 2015. Such regional approach will provide a synergy 
among countries in this region to further boost and sustain economic development based on 
complementarities and economies of scale. ASEAN, being a region richly endowed with natural 
resources, will be able to meet the increasing demand for raw materials, especially oil and gases   15
for its industrial production. At the same time, especially in the electronics and 
telecommunication sector, China will serve as assembly and export platform for ASEAN 
manufactured exports. Chantasasawat, Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2004) find that China’s FDI 
receipts and other Asian countries’ receipts are positively correlated. This evidence together with 
an increasing intraregional trade confirms the every existence of an integrated production system 
in Asia including ASEAN based on international division of labour and each and every country’s 
comparative advantage. 
 
4.2 National Responses 
Besides the regional approach, each ASEAN country also formulates strategies and policy 
responses to the new regional environment. One key strategy common to all ASEAN countries is 
how to free ride the Chinese economic growth and at the same time integrate its economy with 
the Chinese economy. Since China is richly endowed with cheap labor, Singapore and Malaysia 
move up their technological ladders such that their production system is well integrated with that 
of China. In this case, the two countries concentrate on manufacturing of intermediate electronic 
components and export to China for assembly as final consumer electronics for exports. At the 
same time, ASEAN countries that are richly endowed with natural resources, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand are exporting raw materials including oils and gases to China. 
Such complementarities have resulted in a rapid rise in regional intra-trade. In fact, while China 
has a trade surplus with the United States, it has trade deficits with almost all the ASEAN 
countries. 
 
  China, with its rapid economic growth over the decades and also its huge domestic 
market as well as its cheap labor, China represents a substantial investment opportunities for 
ASEAN countries which have significant large ethnic Chinese population. Through their cultural 
affinity, ethnic Chinese businesses have been investing in China and the pace gained momentum 
after China adopted its open door policy in 1978. Ethnic Chinese businesses are able to exploit 
these cultural resources for investment in China (Gao, 2001; Dhales, 2005) and together with 
Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan, they accounted for about 60% of FDI to China. Singapore, 
in particular, accelerated its investment in China since it determination to have regionalization 
drive in 1992. Its main investment drive in China started with the setting up of Suzhou Industrial   16
Park which followed the model of Jurong Industrial Park in Singapore. The project is a joint-
venture between Suzhou Provincial Government and Singapore Government with strong support 
from the Central Government of China. In the initial years, Singapore has a majority share and 
there were conflicts between the two parties. Finally the dispute was settled amicably with the 
Suzhou Provincial Government became the major shareholder. Ethnic Chinese businesses invest 
in China as part of the strategy to avert the New Economic Policy’s rulings which have 
discriminatory effect on ethnic Chinese investment (Ng, 1998). Ethnic Chinese businesses in 
Indonesia were somewhat forced to invest in China as apart of diversification strategy as the 
country constantly encountering political uncertainties. 
 
  With its huge external reserves and also as a strategy to neutralizing capital inflows, 
China began to invest abroad since early 1979. However, investment abroad gained momentum 
since 2001 when there occurred massive capital inflows into China in anticipation of its currency 
appreciation. Cumulatively, China invested the second largest amount of fund in the ASEAN 
region (13.2%) after the European Union (15.3%) (Wong and Chan, 2003). Among the ASEAN 
countries, the largest recipient was Thailand, followed by Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Myanmar. At the same time, about 100 Chinese companies have been listed in the Singapore 
Stock Exchange.  
 
  Another innovative national response toward to the economic rise of China is the 
adoption of “Thaksinomics” by Thailand under the premiership of Thaksin Shinawatra since 
2001. Thaksinomics is a pragmatic response to the demise of the Washington Consensus and the 
East Asian Economic Model (EAEM). These two paradigms which had led to the “Asian 
Miracle” but ended with the Asian financial crisis in 1997, call for a new paradigm to deal with 
the new environment. According to Thaksinomics, it is an eclectic strategy comprising two 
tracks. The first tract is the usual EAEM model which emphasizes export-oriented strategy in 
manufacturing spearheaded by multinational corporations (MNCs). The second track is more 
domestic in focus. It provides strong support to local enterprises leveraging on indigenous skills 
and resources. In the short run, the government strategy is to stimulate domestic demand through 
its expenditure on rural and agricultural sector. In the meantime, the second track also seeks to 
develop new local industries as part of the diversification away from EAEM activities. In   17
addition, the track also attempt to implement measures to assist business to move up the value 
added chain, thus keeping ahead of direct Chinese competition.  
 
  The initial stage of implementing Thaksinomics is the focus on poverty alleviation, 
especially in rural areas. Schemes like “Farm Assistance”, “Urban Relief” and the “Village 
Fund” were implemented to boost rural demand and empower the grassroots. The second stage 
of the implementation is more ambitious and innovative. It includes the Capital Creation Scheme, 
the Vayupak Mutual fund Initiative and Grand Project Schemes. Under the first two schemes, 
assets are reclassified such that they carry the underlying legal rights or documentation necessary 
for collaterized bank loans. The basic idea is to legalize these assets so that owners can use them 
as collateral for bank loans. With this access to capital, owners can use the resources for 
entrepreneurial activities. The first scheme is meant for the rural folks while the second is for the 
government sector. However, the more ambitious scheme is a three mega projects which aim at 
developing Chaing Mai into an international aviation hub; transforming the resort island of 
Pyhuket into a laboratory for high-tech research and development; and cutting a canal across the 
Isthmus of Kra to shorten shipping route between Indian Ocean and South China Sea. 
 
  In short, according to Looney (2003), Thaksinomics “combines elements of demand 
management (Keynesianism), supply side incentives (Reganomics), entrepreneurial development 
(Schumpeterism), grassroots empowerment (de Sotoism) and the structuralist –non-price system 
reorienting- state led growth of Albert Hirschman.” It therefore incorporates globalization and 
comparative advantage, and at the same time, attempts to mould the country’s comparative 
advantage through non-price incentives so that the country is able to withstand severe 
competition from China. 
 
  Under the Thaksinomics programme, Thailand has achieved a reasonable economic 
growth after the Asian financial crisis. The Thai economy accelerated from 2.2% in 2001 to 6.1 
in 2004. In 2005, real GDP growth recorded a slowdown of 3.5% because of the Tsunami 
disaster occurring in December 2004. Inflation recorded less than 3% during 2001-2004 and 
accelerated to 4.2% in 2005 arising from higher oil prices in the latter part of 2005. 
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  Thaksinomics is under heavy criticism both from political oppositions as well as from 
academic. The concept of Thaksinomics seems to be more balanced in its approach but the 
implementation can be extremely difficult in terms of resource constraints and inflationary bias. 
In the longer run, Thailand may have to end up with severe current account deficits and building-
up of external debt. With rising oil prices, the government finally had to abandon its oil subsidies, 
reflecting the need to adjust in the face of reality. The programme also does not address much to 
the remaining structural weaknesses in the corporate and banking sector. 
 
  In response to the economic rise of China, one way is to exploit one’s comparative 
advantage and create a niche area where China has no place to compete. Singapore is a classic 
example. Apart from integrating with the Chinese economy, Singapore also attempts to exploit 
its “state brand” which can readily serve as a bridge between China and the West, as well as a 
bridge between China and India. Owing to its cultural affinity with China, its English speaking 
population as well as multi-racial population, Singapore will be able to forge a strong link among 
these networks. Moreover, with its strength in government, corporate and banking governance, 
Singapore is the most suitable candidate to serve as a trustworthy middleman among countries 
with different business cultures. 
 
  Singapore also has a reputation in patent right protection and also strict rules in hygiene 
and healthcare. It has exploited these comparative advantages to develop its services industries 
such as banking and insurance, telecommunication and information technology. It has also 
developed its bio-chemical industries which normally require patent protection and strict rules on 
healthcare. These are the area where China may have to take time to enforce effectively. to 
expand its international markets, Singapore also signs several free trade agreements with its 
major trading partners such as the United States, Japan, and Australia. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
China may be seen as a threat to the ASEAN economy as indicated by some empirical evidences. 
There are also strong evidence to show that this threat can be turned into potential opportunities 
provided policy responses are conducive to such transition. While regional approach towards the 
rise of China may be considered as rational and positive, the effectiveness and success of such   19
approach depends largely on strong political commitment and co-operation of each and every 
ASEAN member. National policy responses may vary from country to country. There are four 
broad categories. The first is direct confrontation with China through trade disputes and promote 
competitiveness in international market. Second, a country may try to avert such a threat by 
resorting to diversification or by establishing a niche market. Thirdly, instead of direct 
confrontation, the country may free ride the economic boom of the Chinese economy by 
integrating its economy with that of the latter through fostering complementarities (horizontally 
and vertically in international supply chain) and supplementarities. Finally, a country may want 
to follow Thaksinomics approach by adopting two tracks; export oriented strategy and 
stimulating domestic demand amidst developing indigenous skills and entrepreneurship. 
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